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Letters of Interest
A Declaratory Judgment for
Procedure
EDITOR, AMERICAN
JOURNAL:

BAR ASSOCIATION

The writer has made the suggestion
to the Advisory Committee on Rules
for Civil Procedure charged with drafting the proposed new Federal Rules
that those rules should include a provision for a declaratory judgment as
to procedure. The substance of such a
provision would permit any party to
request a ruling from the judge as to
the proper procedure to be followed in
the case then pending. After notice to
other interested parties (unless the
question involved was one as to the
issuance or service of process, where
the matter would have to be decided ex
parte) the judge should enter an order
prescribing a rule for the situation presented, which would be reviewable on
appeal only where an outrageous result
was reached and a party deprived of
some substantial benefit to which he was
clearly entitled.
The necessity for such a provision
in a new code of procedure, which to
a great many lawyers will constitute a
wide departure from a familiar procedure, appears obvious. Its desirability in
any code of procedure seems demonstrable.
A new code is bound to be ambiguous and its exact meaning in the course
of its administration will be subject to
controversy. There is every reason why
such controversy should be definitely
settled during the pleading stage of the
proceeding. It is true that the proposed
rules seek to minimize the effect of
procedural errors, and to give the trial
judge power to compel compliance with
the rules there announced. Those provisions, however, relate always to an
attempted administration of the rules
therein promulgated. Over and above
those rules the trial court should have
the power in case of doubt, or in a case
where the situation is not covered by
one of the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court, to make a rule for the

case at hand which would not be a purported administration of any of the promulgated rules.
It will, of course, be found that situations will develop where no rule is
provided. The Supreme Court when
such defect is found may well take care
of the situation by an amendment to
the adopted rules. In the meantime the
trial courts should be given express
power to deal with such a situation in
the manner suggested and thus avoid a
great deal of prolonged litigation over
strictly procedural matters.
The proposed rules are purposely
stated in broad terms. Language being
what it is there will at the beginning
at least be considerable controversy as
to its exact meaning. Power to define
the terms used for the purposes of a
pending case should be given the trial
courts, not as an administration of the
rules, but as a power to prescribe a
rule for the case at hand.
Where the rule is in terms broad,
but intelligible, its specific application
will cause difficulty. For example, proposed rule 13 (b) provides for the
pleading of "affirmative defenses." In
the cases of contract and statutory
rights this presumably continues the
distinctions between a condition precedent and a condition subsequent, between limitations and an exception or
a proviso. Before the case is disposed
of the trial court will be called upon to
rule whether the situation presented involves one or the other. A plaintiff
or a defendant must now take chances
on what that ruling will be when the
question is raised during the trial.
There is every reason why some method
should be provided whereby such questions, and other similar ones, can be
finally settled before trial.
The same considerations which support a declaratory judgment as to substantive rights support a declaratory
judgment as to procedure.
BERNARD C. GAVIT.
University of Indiana.

The Soviet Constitution on Paper
and in Reality
EDITOR,

AMERICAN

BAR

ASSOCIATION

JOURNAL:

The article commencing on page 589
of the September issue of the JOURNAL
in relation to the projected Soviet Con-

stitution, is another instance of the
publication of a half truth and leads
an uninformed reader to believe that
the majority of the citizens of the Soviet Union must be perfectly happy and
satisfied with a centrally dictated government: social, political and economic. The fact that the control of the
Communist Party is such that free expression of the will of the people is
constitutionally impossible, is not made
clear. Either the Constitution as published in the New York Times was a
distorted or incomplete translation, or
the review in the JOURNAL was hurTiedly written, otherwise it certainly
would not have extolled the document
as being "noteworthy for the civil liberties which it guarantees and the universal suffrage which it provides."
One aspect of civil liberty is the freedom of the people to join together in
political organizations. By clause 126
of the projected constitution, legality
of political organization is limited to
the Communist Party, and it is further
reserved to the members of the Party to
control all executive positions in state
employment, as well as in the tradeunions, cooperative societies, and other
public or semi-public organizations.
Furthermore, the type of club or semipublic organization which can be
formed by the people, is regulated by
the Constitution. Clause 126 provides:
"For the benefit of the working
masses and to induce the mass of the
people to organize themselves and to
take part in political activities, the citizens of the USSR are granted the right
to form social societies: trade-unions,
cooperative societies, youth organizations, cultural, technical and scientific
societies, and the most active and conscious citizens from the ranks of the

